You've probably never thought of this, but the home automation market in the US was worth approximately $3.2 billion in 2010 and is expected to exceed $5.5 billion in 2016.
Under the hood, the Zigbee and Z-wave wireless communication protocols are the most common used RF technology in home automation systems. Zigbee is based on an open specification (IEEE 802.15.4) and has been the subject of several academic and practical security researches. Z-wave is a proprietary wireless protocol that works in the Industrial, Scientific and Medical radio band (ISM). It transmits on the 868.42 MHz (Europe) and 908.42MHz (United States) frequencies designed for low-bandwidth data communications in embedded devices such as security sensors, alarms and home automation control panels.
Unlike Zigbee, almost no public security research has been done on the Z-Wave protocol except once during a DefCon 2011 talk when the presenter pointed to the possibility of capturing the AES key exchange ... until now. Our Black Hat USA 2013 talk explores the question of Z-Wave protocol security and show how the Z-Wave protocol can be subjected to attacks.
The talk is being presented by Behrang Fouladi a Principal Security Researcher at SensePost, with some help on the hardware side from our friend Sahand Ghanoun. Behrang is one of our most senior and most respected analysts. He loves poetry, movies with Owen Wilson, snowboarding and long walks on the beach. Wait - no - that's me. Behrang's the guy who lives in London and has a Masters from Royal Holloway. He's also the guy who figured how to clone the SecureID software token.
Amazingly, this is the 11th time we've presented at Black Hat Las Vegas. We try and keep track of our talks and papers at conferences on our research services site, but for your reading convenience, here's a summary of our Black Hat talks over the last decade:
Setiri was the first publicized trojan to implement the concept of using a web browser to communicate with its controller and caused a stir when we presented it in 2002. We were also very pleased when it got referenced by in a 2004 book by Ed Skoudis.
A paper about targeted, effective, automated attacks that could be used in countrywide cyber terrorism. A worm that targets internal networks was also discussed as an example of such an attack. In some ways, the thinking in this talk eventually lead to the creation of Maltego.
Our thinking around pentest automation, and in particular footprinting and link analyses was further expanded upon. Here we also released the first version of our automated footprinting tool - "Bidiblah".
In this talk we literally did introduce two proxy tools. The first was "Suru', our HTTP MITM proxy and a then-contender to the @stake Web Proxy. Although Suru has long since been bypassed by excellent tools like "Burp Proxy" it introduced a number of exciting new concepts, including trivial fuzzing, token correlation and background directory brute-forcing. Further improvements included timing analysis and indexable directory checks. These were not available in other commercial proxies at the time, hence our need to write our own.
The second proxy we introduced operated at the TCP layer, leveraging off the very excellent Scappy packet manipulation program. We never took that any further, however.
This was one of my favourite SensePost talks. It kicked off a series of research projects concentrating on timing-based inference attacks against all kinds of technologies and introduced a weaponized timing-based data exfiltration attack in the form of our Squeeza SQL Injection exploitation tool (you probably have to be South African to get the joke). This was also the first talk in which we Invented Our Own Acronym.
In this talk we expanded on our ideas of using timing as a vector for data extraction in so-called 'hostile' environments. We also introduced our 'reDuh' TCP-over-HTTP tunnelling tool. reDuh is a tool that can be used to create a TCP circuit through validly formed HTTP requests. Essentially this means that if we can upload a JSP/PHP/ASP page onto a compromised server, we can connect to hosts behind that server trivially. We also demonstrated how reDuh could be implemented under OLE right inside a compromised SQL 2005 server, even without 'sa' privileges.
Yup, we did cloud before cloud was cool. This was a presentation about security in the cloud. Cloud security issues such as privacy, monoculture and vendor lock-in are discussed. The cloud offerings from Amazon, Salesforce and Apple as well as their security were examined. We got an email from Steve "Woz" Wozniak, we quoted Dan Geer and we had a photo of Dino Daizovi. We built an HTTP brute-forcer on Force.com and (best of all) we hacked Apple using an iPhone.
This was a presentation about mining information from memcached. We introduced go-derper.rb, a tool we developed for hacking memcached servers and gave a few examples, including a sexy hack of bps.org. It seemed like people weren't getting our point at first, but later the penny dropped and we've to-date had almost 50,000 hits on the presentation on Slideshare.
Python's Pickle module provides a known capability for running arbitrary Python functions and, by extension, permitting remote code execution; however there is no public Pickle exploitation guide and published exploits are simple examples only. In this paper we described the Pickle environment, outline hurdles facing a shellcoder and provide guidelines for writing Pickle shellcode. A brief survey of public Python code was undertaken to establish the prevalence of the vulnerability, and a shellcode generator and Pickle mangler were written. Output from the paper included helpful guidelines and templates for shellcode writing, tools for Pickle hacking and a shellcode library.We also wrote a very fancy paper about it all...
For this year's show we'll back on the podium with Behrang's talk, as well an entire suite of excellent training courses. To meet the likes of Behrang and the rest of our team please consider one of our courses. We need all the support we can get and we're pretty convinced you won't be disappointed.
See you in Vegas!
well.. 50% right..
But im not going to talk about FireFoxs record breaking download, or the bug that was released in record time.. but want to point you at Andy Inhatko's review of Firefox3. Andy is old school mac diehard, and is a regular on the MacBreak podcast but says:
"But with 3.0 . . . well, we have a victor. Firefox 3.0 should be your default browser, starting right now."
Check it out.. both the review, and the download..
I am probably one of the last ppl around to discover this, but ill post it here for the (probably) 2 other ppl in the world who have yet to stumble upon: Risky Business.
Its pretty hard to find good quality security podcasts without some pretty sad signal to noise ratios (or adverts on spinwrite) but risky business is def. a keeper..
i downloaded a few older episodes to help me through a long drive this weekend, and was very pleasantly surprised.. if u have not yet added it to your podcatcher.. u probably will..
since forever, i've been told (and told others) that the greatest threat is from the inside. turns out, not so much. verizon business (usa) apparently conducted a four year study on incidents inside their organisation and found that the vast majority, 73%, originated from outside. however, the majority of breaches occurred as a result of errors in internal behaviour such as misconfigs, missing patches etc. (62% of cases).
So attackers are generally outsiders taking advantage of bad internal behaviours, rather than local users finding 0-day. From the exec summary:
In a finding that may be surprising to some, most data breaches investigated were caused by external sources. Breaches attributed to insiders, though fewer in number, were much larger than those caused by outsiders when they did occur. As a reminder of risks inherent to the extended enterprise, business partners were behind well over a third of breaches, a number that rose five-fold over the time period of the studyOther interesting snippets that tie directly back into what we cover when we train, and why we think there is value in not only aiming at sploit-writing and 0-day:
Most breaches resulted from a combination of events rather than a single action.
Intrusion attempts targeted the application layer more than the operating system and less than a quarter of attacks exploited vulnerabilities.In other words, bite-sized chunks for the win, core/canvas/metasploit are cute but that's not how customers get owned most often in the real world.
The recent Safari Carpet Bombing bug reported by Nitesh Dhanjani and ignored by Apple had all the makings of an egg-on-face incident. We were discussing it over foosball, and the obvious consensus was "if a line starts with: "thats not exploitable, its only.." then odds are you are wrong.."
Interestingly.. Microsoft bloggers were quick to pounce on this PR-Fiasco in the making. Microsoft released a security advisory commenting on the danger of a "blended threat" - Now.. by accident (or by design) that advisory looks a lot like - "This is an Apple screwup!", indeed one of the solutions is: "Restrict use of Safari as a web browser until an appropriate update is available from Microsoft and/or Apple."
filled in the details, pointing to Avivs 2006 Finding, which is a pure DLL search order bug (which incidentally was published as an IE7 bug). So now the Microsoft folks who were sneering at Safari all end up shuffling their feet a little while looking at the floor. All credit to RHensing from Microsoft, who quickly awarded Microsoft the FAIL open goat award too.. *ouch*
Like sands through the hourglass...