Kerberos
Protected Users: you thought you were safe uh?
On the 31st of October 2022, a PR on CrackMapExec from Thomas Seigneuret (@Zblurx) was merged. This PR fixed Kerberos authentication in the CrackMapExec framework. Seeing that, I instantly wanted to try it out and play a bit with it. While doing so I discovered a weird behaviour with the Protected Users group. In this blogpost I’ll explain what the Protected Users group is, why it is a nice security feature and yet why it is incomplete for the Administrator (RID500) user.
CertPotato – Using ADCS to privesc from virtual and network service accounts to local system
The goal of this blog post is to present a privilege escalation I found while working on ADCS. We will see how it is possible to elevate our privileges to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM from virtual and network service accounts of a domain-joined machine (for example from a webshell on a Windows server) using ADCS. I want to call this attack chain “CertPotato” as homage to other *Potato tools and as a way to better remember it.
Constrained Delegation Considerations for Lateral Movement
The abuse of constrained delegation configuration, whereby a compromised domain user or computer account configured with constrained delegation can be leveraged to impersonate domain users to preconfigured trusted services, is a common attack path in Active Directory. For each trusted service, a unique service ticket is used, that explicitly corresponds to the service type for which it was requested. For example, to access Windows file shares, a CIFS ticket is required. Meanwhile, to leverage the WinRM protocol, a HTTP service ticket is required instead. Compromise of such service tickets aids in lateral movement and further compromise.
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