Malware
Investigating an in-the-wild campaign using RCE in CraftCMS
Introduction In mid-February, Orange Cyberdefense’s CSIRT was tasked with investigating a server that had been hosting a now-unavailable website. The site had been built using CraftCMS running version 4.12.8. The forensic investigation and post-analysis with the Ethical Hacking team led to the discovery of two CVEs: CVE-2024-58136 and CVE-2025-32432.
This blog post aims to present:
The investigation that led to the finding of those two CVEs, and details of the different IOCs found during the analysis. The technical details of both CVEs, explaining how the Craft CMS was vulnerable through the Yii Framewrork. An assessment of the vulnerable assets online. I. Forensic investigation TL;DR On the 14th of February, a threat actor compromised a web server using CVE-2025-32432. The threat actor used it to download a file manager written in PHP on the server which was later used to upload other PHP files to the server. The rest of this section will cover the following points:
Masquerading Windows processes like a DoubleAgent.
I’ve been spending some time building new content for our Introduction to Red Teaming course, which has been great for diving into AV/EDR bypass techniques again. In this blog post, I will demonstrate how to re-weaponise the old “DoubleAgent” technique, making endpoint security products do the hacking work for us.
One known vector to shimmy past AV solutions is to use process injections. At BlackHat 2019, a number of process injection techniques were presented by Itzik Kotler. A typical code injection implementation using known WINAPI functions, such as the combination of VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread are well known by endpoint security solutions and will often raise alerts. Whether static or dynamic analysis kicks in, the chances of remaining undetected when using these functions are close to NULL. Alas, the cat and mouse game keeps going endlessly.
Waiting for goDoH
or DNS exfiltration over DNS over HTTPS (DoH) with godoh “Exfiltration Over Alternate Protocol” techniques such as using the Domain Name System as a covert communication channel for data exfiltration is not a new concept. We’ve used the technique for many years at SensePost, including Haroon & Marco’s 2007 BH/DC talk on Squeeza. In the present age this is a well understood topic, at least amongst Infosec folks, with a large number of resources, available, online that aim to enlighten those that may not be familiar with the concept. There are also practical techniques for detecting DNS Tunnelling on your network.
Understanding Locky
A few days ago I was asked to have a look at the newly emerged crypto-ransomware threat “Locky” which utilises Dridex-like Command and Control (C&C) communications techniques. For some background reading, I recommend you read the following:
http://sensorstechforum.com/aes-128-encryption-employed-by-locky-ransomware/ https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/02/17/locky-ransomware-what-you-need-to-know/) http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2447460/dridex-style-locky-ransomware-is-infecting-machines-via-microsoft-word It looks like a new (FEB2016) addition to the crypto-ransomware family :
1. Dirty Decrypt
2. CryptoLocker
3. CryptoWall / Cryptodefense
4. Critroni / CTB Locker
5. TorrentLocker
6. Cryptographic Locker
7. TeslaLocker
8. Locky
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