10 September 2012
~1 min
By behrang
Today’s smart cards such as banking cards and smart corporate badges are capable of running multiple tiny applications which are often written in high level programming languages like Java or Microsoft .NET and compiled into small card resident binaries. It is a critical security requirement to isolate the execution context and data storage of these applications in order to protect them from unauthorized access by other malicious card applications. To satisfy this requirement, multi-application smart cards implement an “Application Firewall” concept in their operating system which creates an execution sandbox for card applications.
There has been a healthy reaction to our initial post on our research into the RSA SecureID Software Token. A number of readers had questions about certain aspects of the research, and I thought I’d clear up a number of concerns that people have.
The research pointed out two findings; the first of which is in fact a design vulnerability in RSA software’s “Token Binding” mechanism. The second finding is another design issue that affects not only RSA software token but also any other software, which generates pseudo-random numbers from a “secret seed” running on traditional computing devices such as laptops, tablets or mobile phones. The correct way of performing this has been approached with hardware tokens, which are often tamper-resistant.
Widespread use of smart phones by employees to perform work related activities has introduced the idea of using these devices as an authentication token. As an example of such attempts, RSA SecureID software tokens are available for iPhone, Nokia and the Windows platforms. Obviously, mobile phones would not be able to provide the level of tamper-resistance that hardware tokens would, but I was interested to know how easy/hard it could be for a potential attacker to clone RSA SecureID software tokens. I used the Windows version of the RSA SecurID Software Token for Microsoft Windows version 4.10 for my analysis and discovered the following issues:
13 September 2011
~2 min
By glenn
I gave an updated version of my ‘Hacking Online Auctions’ talk at UnCon in London last week. The talk gave a brief intro to general auction theory, and how the models can be applied online, but the main focus was on ‘penny auction’ websites. What are those all about then? Well, during my Masters last year I took a course on Internet Economics, and one of the modules involved auction theory. It was a really interesting module, and I did a bit of my own research on the side, whereby I stumbled across various penny auction sites. The sites (who pretend to be akin to eBay or the likes) go a little something like this: